It is safe to say that the COVID-ridden years have not been too kind on housing developers in Malaysia. Not only are they forced to manage the uncertainty and unprecedented difficulty caused by the virus, but recent decisions from our superior Courts have also seemingly added salt into their wounds.
Once a successful party obtains an adjudication decision under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act (CIPAA) 2012, the next course of action is usually to enforce the adjudication decision pursuant to section 28 of the CIPAA (enforcement order). Meanwhile, the losing party will often attempt to set aside or stay the adjudication decision under sections 15 or 16 of the CIPAA.
However, what if an application to stay is made after an enforcement order is granted against the adjudication decision and the application to set aside the adjudication decision is dismissed? The court was faced with this scenario in the recent case of MKP Builders Sdn Bhd v PC Geotechnic Sdn Bhd [(2021) MLJU 1061].
Article 13 of the Federal Constitution states that “no person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law” and allows for a
lawful acquisition of private land by the government, provided that the acquisition is in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act (LAA)
1960. Under the LAA, landowners (or persons with registered interests) will be compensated by the government for acquired land. That said, landowners often find themselves dissatisfied with the compensation awarded by the land administrator. While there is an
opportunity for landowners to object to the compensation, the question remains as to what extent the compensation awarded by the land
administrator can be challenged. The Federal Court recently answered this question in its decision in Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd. The apex court held that the high court is the highest court that parties can go to when challenging the
In The United States of America v Menteri Sumber Manusia Malaysia, the high court judge ruled in favour of the United States (for further details please see “Embassy dismisses employee: exercise of jure imperii or act of jure gestionis?”). However, this decision has now been set aside by the Court of Appeal.
The rule against hearsay evidence prevents the admission of evidence of information from a third party. The evidence from a third party will generally be regarded as hearsay evidence and thus inadmissible, unless the third party him/herself testifies on the said evidence. This rule has been applied to witnesses of fact and opinion.
However, to what extent should this rule be relaxed when experts seek to rely on hearsay evidence in their reports, and in what circumstances should such evidence be admissible? This was the question that arose, amongst many others, for the determination of the Singapore International Commercial Court (‘SICC’) in Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another.